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Kagiko & Associates-Accounting Experts Financial & Accounting Consultancy. Primarily Book-keeping, Tax, & Payroll. Consult us today for Free! We offer value adding services to our clients.
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We help Accounting Professionals & Businesses manage their finances to ensure compliance with authorities and make sound financial decisions. Registered and Practicing CPAs, Business Advisory, Trainers and Consultants. Our services Include:
1. Book Keeping
2. Tax Advisory
3. Forensic Audit
4. Training

15/10/2026

I&M Bank, a Five-Year Deadline, and a KSh 713 Million Dispute

There was a time when a single accounting entry could sit quietly inside a bank’s books and never meet the tax file that held the same number under a different name. The audited accounts told one story. The tax computation told another. For years the two records often travelled in parallel.

That separation has narrowed.

In 2019 I&M Bank reclassified Kshs 1,313,248,000 within its loan book and the provision held against it. The movement was a balance-sheet adjustment linked to the adoption of IFRS 9. It did not pass through the profit and loss account. It produced neither income nor a deduction. On the face of the accounts it was a write-back of provision, not a write-off of bad debts.

KRA read the same figure differently. After reviewing the bank’s records, the authority treated the Kshs 1.313 billion as untraced bad debts written off. That single item generated tax, penalty and interest of approximately Kshs 713 million.

The procedural history was tight. I&M filed its 2019 return on 17 June 2020. Under the law KRA had five years from that date to issue an amended assessment. The deadline was 17 June 2025. On 16 June 2025—one day before the limit—KRA issued an assessment through iTax demanding roughly Kshs 1.316 billion in principal tax and Kshs 961 million in interest, a total near Kshs 2.277 billion. The following day an Excel sheet of “Preliminary Findings” arrived with different numbers. On 1 July 2025 a formal letter titled “Notice of Assessment for the Period 2019” explained six adjustments and raised the total to about Kshs 2.343 billion. The bank was told to treat the letter as the assessment. It objected on 23 July 2025.

In its Objection Decision of 19 September 2025, KRA dropped most of the adjustments. It retained two. One was a minor brokerage cost of roughly Kshs 1.67 million linked to exempt infrastructure bond income; after recalculation the bank paid Kshs 965,742 including penalty and interest. The second, and the only material item left, was the Kshs 1.313 billion. That figure alone carried the Kshs 713 million tax bill.

The bank appealed to the Tax Appeals Tribunal on 3 November 2025. It argued that the iTax assessment of 16 June 2025 lacked sufficient reasons, that the Excel sheet was only a draft, and that the 1 July letter—issued after the five-year deadline and outside iTax—was time-barred and void. On the substance, it maintained that the Kshs 1.313 billion was a write-back of provision, not a bad-debt deduction.

KRA maintained that the 16 June iTax assessment was valid and within time, and that the later documents merely explained an assessment already made. It also argued that the bank had failed to prove the amount was allowable.

The Tribunal framed two questions. First, was the assessment valid and on time? Second, was KRA correct to disallow the Kshs 1.313 billion?

On the first question the Tribunal sided with KRA. The iTax assessment of 16 June 2025 contained the required particulars—tax, penalty, interest, period, due date and the right to object—and was issued within the five-year window, even if only by a single day. The Excel sheet was not an assessment. The 1 July letter supplied reasons for an assessment already made; its lateness did not invalidate the earlier notice. The bank’s procedural objections therefore failed.

On the second question the Tribunal sided with the bank. The audited statements showed that the bank had written off Kshs 2.918 billion in 2019. Of that sum, Kshs 906 million had been charged directly to profit and loss and was correctly added back in the tax computation. The remaining Kshs 2.012 billion was taken against the existing provision. KRA had treated a net movement of Kshs 698 million as the write-off and concluded that the balance of Kshs 1.313 billion could not be traced. The Tribunal found that the Kshs 698 million was itself a net figure: the result of writing off Kshs 2.012 billion from the provision and simultaneously writing back Kshs 1.313 billion into it. The disputed amount was therefore a write-back arising from the IFRS 9 transition. It was a reclassification between the loan book and the allowance held against it. It never entered the profit and loss account, generated no deduction, and produced no taxable income. KRA had mistaken a net accounting movement for a gross write-off and sought to tax a figure that had never been claimed as a deduction.

On 9 October 2026 the Tribunal delivered its judgment. The appeal was allowed. The Objection Decision of 19 September 2025 was set aside. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

The dates protected the assessment: the notice of 16 June 2025 was within time, and the later explanatory letter, though late, was not the assessment itself. On the money, however, the bank prevailed. The Kshs 1.313 billion was a write-back, not a bad debt. The case turned on the difference between the form of an accounting entry and its substance for tax purposes. When those two records finally met, the entry that looked like a write-off proved to be something else entirely.

KRA Clarifies
15/10/2026

KRA Clarifies

Scheduled Maintenance
15/10/2026

Scheduled Maintenance

14/10/2026

The Hidden Capital Gains Trap: Why Selling Land to Family at a Loss Can Trigger Tax Bills

A common assumption among property owners is that disposing of an asset below its purchase price shields them from Capital Gains Tax (CGT). However, when transactions occur between related parties, tax authorities often apply entirely different rules—turning what looks like a financial loss into an unexpected tax liability.

The Problem with "Family Discounts"

Imagine a scenario where a property was originally purchased for 10 million. Facing sudden cash flow pressures, the owner attempts to sell it at various market prices without finding an external buyer. Out of desperation, a family member steps in to purchase the land at a heavily discounted price of 6 million.

The seller assumes that because the property was offloaded below its original acquisition cost—resulting in a nominal 4-million-loss—no tax obligations apply.

How the Revenue Authority Handles Related-Party Transfers

Tax frameworks are designed to monitor non-arm's-length transactions (deals between relatives or connected persons) to prevent artificial price manipulation intended to dodge taxes.

When tax collectors flag a transaction as occurring between related parties:

1. Independent Valuation: The authority appoints a property valuer to determine the asset's true open-market value.
2. Price Substitution: If the official valuation is higher than the transaction price (e.g., assessed at 12 million), the tax authority overrides the actual cash received (6 million) and uses the higher valuation instead.
3. Manufactured Capital Gains: Tax is computed based on the difference between the official valuation and the original purchase cost, even though the seller pocketed far less cash.

Key Takeaway for Asset Disposals

The core issue isn't the transaction price itself, but who you transact with. Disposing of property below market value to family members can easily be recharacterized as tax avoidance, leaving sellers responsible for tax on gains they never actually realized.

13/10/2026

Piercing the Corporate Shield: Why Company Directors Face Personal Tax Liability

Many business leaders operate under a false sense of security. They believe that operating as a limited liability company insulates them from personal legal exposure when tax obligations go unmet. While corporate identity does create a legal distinction between a business and its owners, this shield is far from unbreakable.

The Fallacy of Personal Immunity

A common trap for company executives is viewing corporate registration as an absolute safeguard against personal liability. This often leads to reckless assumptions when financial pressures arise:

Believing tax debts belong solely to the corporation, insulating management.
Diverting withheld payroll taxes (PAYE) or collected sales taxes (VAT) into daily working capital.
Assuming that signing off on inaccurate or fraudulent tax filings carries no individual consequences.

When tax authorities audit a non-compliant business, simply hiding behind the corporate entity as a defense strategy fails in practice.

Corporate Offenses and Personal Accountability

Under Kenya’s Tax Procedures Act (Section 103), the law looks beyond corporate entity status when tax offenses occur:

1. Executive Liability (Section 103(2)): When a corporation violates tax laws, key management figures—including Chief Executives, Managing Directors, Directors, and Company Secretaries—can be held personally accountable for the company’s misconduct.
2. Statutory Exceptions (Section 103(3)): An officer can avoid personal liability only if they can establish two conditions:
The breach occurred entirely without their knowledge or consent.
They exercised proper oversight and reasonable due diligence in line with their operational responsibilities to prevent the breach.

Practical Key Takeaways for Directors

Collected taxes are held in trust: Taxes deducted from employee salaries or collected from customers belong to the revenue authority, not the business. Using them for operating cash flow creates severe personal legal risk.
Active oversight is essential: Passive governance is not a legal shield. Directors must establish robust compliance systems and actively monitor tax filings to demonstrate reasonable diligence.

12/10/2026

From Small-Town Signboard to KSh 1 Billion Ghost: The Rise and Quiet Death of Ukwala Supermarket

_One day In November 2019, workers at branches across Eldoret were called into brief meetings at the end of their shifts and told not to come back the next day_

The story begins where most strange tales start: with a ghost that refuses to stay dead.

If you wander onto a quiet corner of the internet, you might stumble upon a sleek web page with a single headline— *Ukwala Supermarket Reopening 2025 Recruitment*. It promises roles for cashiers, shelf stackers, and security guards across Nairobi, Kisumu, and Eldoret.

There’s just one tiny problem. Ukwala Supermarket Limited is dead. Not struggling. Not restructuring. It was officially liquidated, gazetted, and struck off the company’s register. Yet, like a ghost haunting Kenya’s digital landscape, its name is still being used to draw people in.

To understand how a retail powerhouse became bait for job seekers, you have to rewind 30 years to a time when shopping in Kenya looked completely different.

In the early 1990s, the average Kenyan didn't push a trolley down wide, air-conditioned aisles. You walked up to a counter, asked the shopkeeper for half a kilo of sugar, and waited as they picked each item off a shelf behind them.

Then came economic liberalization. Price controls vanished, import channels opened, and a few visionary entrepreneurs saw an opening. Among them were the Shah and Dodia families. They took the name of a sleepy, dust-swept administrative town in Siaya County—Ukwala—and hung it over a shopfront in the heart of Nairobi.

Ukwala didn’t build its empire on luxury. It didn’t target shoppers looking for imported cheeses or expensive wines. The stores were narrow, cramped, and lit by buzzing fluorescent bulbs. Space was so tight that pushing a trolley was practically impossible; shoppers squeezed through aisles with handheld plastic baskets, grabbing maize flour, cooking oil, and soap.

It was built for volume. With average basket sizes hovering around KSh 400, Ukwala survived on pure foot traffic—serving over 1.1 million shoppers a year across Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret. On paper, it was a cash-generating machine.

But retail has a brutal rule: you can look extremely busy and still be completely broke.

Because supermarket margins are razor-thin, money sits tied up in inventory and unpaid supplier bills. To stay alive, you need constant momentum. If the cash flow stumbles even once, the machine breaks down.

Behind the scenes, Ukwala’s structure was a labyrinth of separate corporate entities—Ukwala Supermarket Limited, Ukwala Eldoret, and regional variations—making it hard to tell where one business ended and another began. By 2013, the seams were starting to show.

In a desperate bid to manage operations, Ukwala made a quiet, informal handshake deal with competitor Tuskys. Tuskys took over management and pricing for three major Ukwala branches in Nairobi. It was an illegal arrangement—what regulator circles call an unapproved merger. The Competition Authority of Kenya stepped in, slapped them with a KSh 5.3 million fine, and ordered the partnership unwound.

Ukwala was scrambling for a lifeline. And in 2015, they thought they found one.

Enter Choppies, the Botswana retail giant looking to expand rapidly across East Africa. Choppies agreed to acquire a 75% stake in 10 Ukwala outlets for roughly $10 million (KSh 1 billion).

It looked like the ultimate bailout. But as the deal was being signed, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) stepped into the room with a massive demand: KSh 946 million in back taxes and penalties.

The acquisition slammed into a wall. For 18 months, the deal hung in legal limbo while the tax dispute was negotiated down to a KSh 59.7 million settlement. During those uncertain months,t branch managers and cashiers showed up every morning not knowing if their paychecks would clear or if the name above the door would change by sunset.

When Choppies finally took over in 2016, they poured millions into modernizing the stores. Narrow, dusty aisles were replaced by gleaming white floors, wide corridors, and shiny new trolleys. They opened shiny new branches in suburban malls like Signature Mall on Mombasa Road.

Yet, paint doesn't pay salaries. While the store floors looked high-end, the company was burning through working capital at an alarming rate.

By 2018, the floor fell out completely.

In the retail world, death doesn't happen suddenly; it happens item by item. First, the fresh milk disappears from the fridge. Then soda stock thins out. Soon, suppliers—tired of waiting 60, 90, or 120 days for payment—stop delivering altogether. Shelves turn into empty white expanses. Customers walk next door, and cash flow dries up entirely.

In October 2018, Ukwala's directors resolved to go into formal liquidation. In court filings under Insolvency Petition E015 of 2018, Director V.J. Gantilal Dodia delivered the plain, unvarnished truth: the company was drowning in nearly KSh 1 billion of debt owed to banks, suppliers, and the taxman, against just KSh 19.3 million in remaining assets.

The human cost was immediate. In November 2019, workers at branches across Eldoret were called into brief meetings at the end of their shifts and told not to come back the next day. Some had worked there for over 17 years—watching the company rise, rebrand, and collapse beneath their feet.

By 2020, Choppies pulled out of Kenya entirely, cutting its losses and writing off hundreds of millions in debt.

The final act of Ukwala’s death took years of paperwork, asset auctions, and legal battles. Creditors fought over leftover shelving and refrigeration units sold off as second-hand scrap.

On December 20, 2024, the liquidator convened the final creditors’ meeting. There was no crowded boardroom or dramatic court showdown; it took place over a Zoom link.

Three months later, on March 28, 2025, Ukwala Supermarket Limited was officially gazetted and struck off the register of companies.

Thirty years of history—from a small town in Siaya to a KSh 1 billion retail empire—ended quietly in an online video call and a line of text in the Kenya Gazette.

Deadline Daytax.kagikoassociates.com
09/10/2026

Deadline Day
tax.kagikoassociates.com

HAPPY CUSTOMERS SERVICE WEEK
09/10/2026

HAPPY CUSTOMERS SERVICE WEEK

ATTENTION TO ALL KASNEB STUDENTS AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS!
08/10/2026

ATTENTION TO ALL KASNEB STUDENTS AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS!

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